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Danish “Church People” and the Modern
Welfare State
KLAUS PETERSEN AND JØRN HENRIK PETERSEN
This contribution analyzes the views held by Danish and Norwegian church people
regarding the welfare state, as expressed in the period when the general debate on
the welfare state culminated in both countries. Generally speaking, religion played a
relatively limited role in international welfare state research, which can be referred to
as “blind to religion.” Tough socio-economic variables, well-established political
actors, and government interests dominate the field. There are examples of religion
as one among many variables, but when it has been ascribed explanatory value, it
predominantly has been in relation to southern and continental European welfare
models, because the focus has been on Catholicism. In recent years, the frequently
mentioned “cultural turn” has made its entrance into comparative welfare research;
yet, even then culture and religion are often assigned a modest role in “the black
box,” which is invoked when the “harder” data are insufficient. Most recently,
historians and church historians have launched a discussion on the Lutheran Nordic
welfare state, but so far this discussion has not analyzed empirically the role of the
church in the golden age of the welfare state. In this article, we go directly to those
involved and examine what the church actors really felt about the post-war welfare state.
It can be argued that the particular Danish welfare state is an expression of
Christianity, having permeated every corner of society, daily life and
social life. We are Christians without saying we are Christians—and
almost without going to church.
–Editorial in the Danish newspaper BT, April 14, 2006
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DURING the past ten to fifteen years, a small group of researcherssystematically investigated and discussed the relationship betweenreligion and the development of the welfare state. Among other
things, they studied religious actors outside the government framework (not
least Christian philanthropy)1—or described the role of religion in political
ideologies and as “civil religion.”2 Other scholars focused on Christian-
Democratic parties and their role in conflicts, ruptures, and compromises.3
Kees Van Kersbergen and Philip Manow conclude that “differences between
Catholicism and Protestantism as well as differences between various forms
of Protestantism are important if one is to understand why different countries
chose different paths of socio-political development.”4
A similar discussion about the importance of Lutheranism for the
development of the Nordic welfare model can be found among Nordic
researchers, who adopted a historical-institutional perspective5 or discussed
1See for example Seth Koven and Sonya Michel, eds., Mothers of a New World: Maternalist
Politics and the Origins of the Welfare State (New York: Routledge, 1993) especially chapters 1,
3 and 10; Gisela Bock and Pat Thane, eds., Maternity & Gender Policies: Women and the Rise
of the European Welfare States 1880s–1950s (London: Routledge, 1991); Dorothy Marie Brown
and Elizabeth McKeown, The Poor Belong to Us: Catholic Charities and American Welfare
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1997).
2Michael Opielka, “Religiöse Werte imWohlfahrtsstaat, Entstaatlichung und soziale Sicherheit,”
in Verhandlungen des 31. Kongresses der Deutschen Gesellschaft für Soziologie in Leipzig 2002
(Opladen: Leske and Budrich, 2003).
3Francis G. Castles, “On Religion and Public Policy: Does Catholicism make a difference?,”
European Journal of Political Research 25, no. 1 (1994): 19–40; Harold Wilensky, The Welfare
State and Equality. Structural and Ideological Roots of Public Expenditure (Berkeley:
University of California Press, 1975); Michael Opielka, “Christian Foundations of the Welfare
State: Strong cultural values in comparative perspectives,” in Culture and Welfare State: Values
and Social Policy in Comparative Perspective, eds. Wim van Oorschot, Michael Opielka, and
Birgit Pfau-Effinger (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2008), 89–114; Kees van Kersbergen, Social
Capitalism: A Study of Christian Democracy and the Welfare State (London: Routledge, 1995);
Kimberley J. Morgan, “Forging the Frontiers between State, Church, and Family: Religious
Cleavages and the Origins of Early Childhood Education and Care Policies in France, Sweden
and Germany,” Politics & Society 30, no. 1 (2002): 113–148; Philip Manow, “The Good, the
Bad and the Ugly: Esping-Andersen’s Regime Typology and the Religious Roots of the Western
Welfare State,” Working Paper 04/3 (Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies: 2004),
http://www.mpifg.de/pu/workpap/wp04-3/wp04-3.html; Patrick Emmenegger, “Catholicism, Job
Security Regulations and Female Employment: A Micro-Level Analysis of Esping-Andersen’s
Social Catholicism Thesis,” Social Policy & Administration 44, no. 1 (2010): 20–39; Martin
Seeleib-Kaiser, Silke van Dyk, and Martin Roggenkamp, Party Politics and Social Welfare:
Comparing Christian and Social Democracy in Austria, Germany and the Netherlands
(Cheltenham, U.K.: Edward Elgar, 2008).
4Kees van Kersbergen and Philip Manow, eds., Religion, Class Coalitions and Welfare States
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2009), 210–235.
5See: Tim Knudsen, “Tilblivelsen af den universalistiske velfærdsstat” in Den nordiske
protestantisme og velfærdsstaten, ed. Tim Knudsen (Århus: Århus Universitetsforlag, 2000), 20–
64; idem, “De nordiske statskirker og velfærdsstaten,” in 13 historier om den danske
velfærdsstat, ed. Klaus Petersen (Odense: Syddansk Universitetsforlag, 2003), 37–47.
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the importance of Lutheranism for Nordic political culture.6 In a Danish
context, interest has been oriented toward actors connected with the church,
including religiously inspired economists,7 church organizations in a broad
sense,8 or leading theological thinkers and social debaters.9 Attempts have
been made to outline a particular Nordic, Lutheran welfare model that
typically emphasizes the classic Weberian argument about Lutheranism’s
particular work ethic,10 points to the importance of Pietism in the building of
the Danish state model,11 or promotes a specific form of secularized Nordic
Lutheranism.12
To a great extent, these explanations are at a high level of abstraction, and
tend to focus on a historical period prior to the emergence of the modern
Danish welfare state. They are of so general a nature that it is difficult to
determine how and on what basis the argument could be falsified.13
Sociologist Sigrun Kahl attempted to develop this discussion further, so that
6Henrik Stenius, “The Good Life is a Life of Conformity,” in The Cultural Construction of
Norden, eds. Øystein Sørensen and Bo Stråht (Oslo: Scandinavian University Press, 1997), 161–
171. Furthermore, some researchers have problematized the idea of a “Lutheran welfare model”
by pointing to the importance of Christian socio-political thinking in the medieval period. See
for example: Carsten Selch Jensen, “Hvad nyt? En velfærdsstat med middelalderlige rødder,” in
13 historier om den danske velfærdstat, 15–26.
7Niels Kærgård, “Tre økonomiske professorers teologi,” Kirkehistoriske Samlinger VII.8.C
(1997), 129–197; Niels Kærgård, “Den lille kristne nationalstat: historie og dilemmaer,”
Velfærdsstat og kirke, eds. Jens H. Schørring and Jens T. Bak (Copenhagen: Anis, 2005): 35–51.
8Liselotte Malmgart, “To reaktioner på den danske socialreform i 1933,” in Velfærdsstat og
Kirke, 53–68; Hilda Rømer Christensen, Mellem backfische og pæne piger. Køn og kultur i
KFUK 1883–1940 (Copenhagen: Museum Tusculanum Press 1995); Pirjo Markkola, ed.,
Gender and Vocation: Women, Religion and Social Change in the Nordic Countries (Helsinki:
SKS, 2000); Karin Lützen, Byen tæmmes. Kernefamilie, sociale reformer og velgørenhed i 1800-
tallets København (Copenhagen: Gyldendal, 1998).
9Tyge Svenstrup, “Den etiske socialisme. Biskop Martensens samfundssyn i 1870erne,” in Den
nordiske protestantisme og velfærdsstaten, 98–123; Jørn Henrik Petersen and Lis Holm Petersen,
“Gensidig eller ensidig. Om Løgstrups etiske fordring og velfærdsstatens normative grundlag,”
in Livtag med den etiske fordring, eds. David Bugge and Peter Aaboe Sørensen (Århus: Århus
Universitetsforlag, 2007), 209–230.
10Horst Feldmann, “Protestantism, Labor Force Participation, and Employment across
Countries,” American Journal of Economics and Sociology 66, no. 4 (2007): 795–816.
11Aage B. Sørensen, “On Kings, Pietism and Rent-seeking in Scandinavian Welfare States,” Acta
Sociologica 41 (1998): 363–375.
12Pirjo Markkola, “The Lutheran Nordic Welfare States,” in Beyond Welfare State Models:
Transnational Historical Perspectives on Social Policy, eds. Pauli Kettunen and Klaus Petersen
(London: Edward Elgar, 2010), 102–118; Mie Andersen and Bente Rosenbeck, “Ligestilling,
ægteskab og religion,” Kvinder, køn og forskning 4 (2006): 17–31; Kari Melby, Anu Pylkkänen,
Bente Rosenbeck, and Christina Carlsson Wetterberg, Äktenskap och politik i Norden ca. 1850–
1930 (Lund: Makadame 2006); Uffe Østergaard, “Lutheranismen, danskheden og
velfærdsstaten,” in 13 historier om den danske velfærdsstat, 27–36; Lars Bo Kaspersen and
Johannes Lindvall, “Why No Religious Politics? The Secularization of Poor Relief and Primary
Education in Denmark and Sweden,” Archives européennes de sociologie, 44 (2008): 119–143.
13See Peter Baldwin, “Riding the Subways of Gemeinschaft,” Acta Sociologica 41 (1998): 378–
380 for a similar argument.
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it forms a stronger link between the modern version of the welfare state and the
content of religion—the “social doctrines” of the various Christian creeds.14
Kahl’s point is that religion should be seen as a key concept in
understanding the diverse forms of welfare states:
Religion has influenced welfare state development by structuring the way
actors construct what is a problem and which solutions are considered
good and just, because, once “elected,” these values are part of countries’
institutional traditions. The repertoire of what was considered possible,
just and efficient in a given historical situation comes from the past, and
elective affinities guide the political decision about reform. . . . In short, a
(but not the) reason that construals of “good” solutions to social policy
problems differ is that institutional traditions are embedded in different
cultures.15
There are problems, however, in transferring Kahl’s argument to Nordic
relations and interpreting the welfare state as a child of evangelical-Lutheran
thinking. First, there is a question of whether variations in “faith-conditioned
social doctrines” exist between Catholicism, Lutheranism, and reformed
Protestantism. In Catholicism, there is an official text corpus that defines
social principles and moral teachings, derived mainly from papal
encyclicals.16 It is debatable whether one can speak of a similarly formed,
evangelical-Lutheran social doctrine. The Danish church does not have any
uniform character or any synod-like institution able to formulate or approve
“statements of principle.” A few researchers17 have tried to derive a social
doctrine from Luther’s writings, but since these are inscribed in a sixteenth-
century context, it is difficult to relate them in meaningful way to
contemporary discussions of the welfare state (though they can certainly be
included in any general understanding of the roots of the welfare state).
Second, we lack a precise definition of “welfare state.” Researchers in this
14See Sigrun Kahl, “Religious Doctrines and Poor Relief: A Different Causal Pathway,” in
Religion, Class Coalitions and Welfare States, 267–298; idem, The Religious Foundations of the
Welfare State: Poverty Regimes, Unemployment, and Welfare-to-Work in Europe and the United
States (PhD diss. Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, 2006).
15Kahl, Religious Foundations, 77.
16Numerous German socio-political texts thus refer explicitly to Catholic social teaching or
Catholic social doctrines. See: Ursula Schoen, Subsidiarität. Bedeutung und Wandel des Begriffs
in der katholischen Soziallehre und in der deutschen Sozialpolitik. Eine
diakoniewissenschaftliche Untersuchung (Neukirchen: Neukirchen-Vluyn, 1998); Oswald von
Nell-Breuning, Soziale Sicherheit. Zu Grundfragen der Sozialordnung aus christlicher
Verantwortung (Freiburg: Herder Verlag, 1979); idem, Baugesteze der Gesellsschaft. Solidarität
und Subsidarität (Freiburg: Herder Verlag, 1990).
17Dag Thorkildsen, “Religious Identity and Nordic Identity,” in The Cultural Construction of
Norden, 144; Svend Andersen, “Religion og social sammenhæng. Kristendommen og den
moderne velfærdsstat. Et teologisk perspektiv,” Religionsvidenskabeligt Tidsskrift 48 (2006):
25–34.
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tradition very seldom deal with developments after the 1890s, when what could
be called modern social legislation took shape.18 In other words, the emphasis
in their “explanation” is on historical developments at a time when the term
“welfare state” was unknown, much less a public social security system of
the kind developed in the post-1945 era. A search for the “roots of the
welfare state” must be carried out without resorting to an unjustifiable
retrospective projection.
This article offers an alternative approach to the question of the relationship
between religion and the welfare state. It focuses on that period when religious
thinking (by individuals and institutions) and welfare politics actually
encountered each other. In the 1950s and 1960s, Denmark developed into a
modern welfare state in the classic social political meaning of the word.19
How did the Danish church, or Danish “church people,” react when the
welfare state was placed on the societal agenda during the early 1950s?
Isolated investigations of religious reactions to welfarism in neighboring
countries of Great Britain, Norway, and Sweden reveal a degree of
skepticism about the welfare state on the part of church people.20 Here we
will focus on reactions in Denmark. If the welfare state was indeed a child
of Lutheran Christian preaching, one would expect “church people” to have
had a more positive reaction than the population in general. Consequently, a
closer study of Danish church people’s attitudes toward the welfare state is
an important new contribution to the academic discussion on church,
Lutheranism, and the welfare state.
In the following, we examine Danish church people’s reactions to the
emerging welfare state during the first post-World War II decades—a period
often referred to as the “breakthrough years” or as the “golden age” of the
welfare state.21 As mentioned, the Danish church does not have any formal
18This is well established in the welfare state research. See for example Stein Kuhnle and Anne
Sander, “The Emergence of the Western Welfare State,” in The Oxford Handbook of the Welfare
State, eds. Castles et al. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 61–80.
19Gøsta Esping-Andersen, Politics against Markets: The Social Democratic Road to Power
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985); Klaus Petersen, Legitimität und Krise. Die
politische Geschichte des dänischen Wohlfahrtsstaates 1945–1953 (Berlin: Berlin Verlag, 1998).
20E. R. Norman, Church and Society in England 1770–1970, A Historical Study (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1976); Aud V. Tønnesen, “Et trygt og godt hjem for alle”? Kirkelederes
kritikk av velferdsstaten etter 1945 (Trondheim: Tapir, 2000); Mathhew Grimley, Citizenship,
Community and the Church of England: Liberal Anglican Theories of the State between the
Wars (Oxford: Clarendon Press 2004); Karin Anderson, “The Church as a Nation? The Role of
Religion in the Development of the Swedish Welfare State,” in Religion, Class Coalitions and
Welfare State, 210–235.
21See Petersen, Legitimität und Krise. In addition, this investigation is based on an examination
of a considerable amount of textual material. For the general media picture, we base ourselves on a
collection of newspaper clippings in Henning Friis’s private archive (The Danish National
Archive), an examination of Dansk Kronikindeks and bibliotek.dk as well as a number of more
specific searches. For the more internal church debate, we have reviewed a number of key
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or unequivocal attitude toward social development. Hence, we have decided to
use the concept “church people” as an overall category for those who speak “on
behalf of the church,” and to include in our investigation the four major
positions articulated in the Danish church debate of the time: (1) the Indre
Mission (The Church Association for the Inner Mission in Denmark), which
since the end of the nineteenth century had been involved in various forms
of social work; (2) the Karl Barth-inspired theoretical and more socially
critical theological position associated with the journal Tidehverv; (3)
Grundtvigianism, which had a strong position in the Danish state church;
and (4) church philanthropy/social work. Finally, we also examine certain
leading individuals.
Since we chose to focus on the most influential groups within the Danish
Lutheran church, we rule out other Christian churches such as the Catholic
Church.22 It also means we address the groups as ideological or theological
positions rather than as individuals representing institutional (within or
outside the church) or political positions. In some rare cases, links to
political parties or political ambitions probably influenced positions vis-a-vis
the welfare state. Professor Hal Koch is the most obvious example, and
some church people have probably been active in political parties. In the
end, however, we find no clear pattern. We will return to this discussion in
the conclusion of the paper.
By way of introduction, we will start our tour by taking a look at the formal
position of the church in general, and the historical development of the church-
state relationship throughout the twentieth century with special emphasis on
social work and social policies.
I. CHURCH, STATE, AND WELFARE IN DENMARK23
In Denmark, the Reformation was carried out with great violence, having the
character of a coup d’état on the part of the king. In August 1537, King
Christian III was crowned the legitimate Christian king, but without use of
the traditional rites of the Catholic Church. A month later, the king signed
the Church Ordinance. The Ordinance was clearly Lutheran. It obliged the
periodicals such as Præsteforeningens Blad, Tidehverv, Indre Missions Tidende, and Dansk
Kirkeliv.
22The Catholic Church is a very small religious minority in Denmark. For a discussion of the
Catholic Church and the welfare state in Britain, see Peter Coman, Catholics and the Welfare
State (London: Longmann, 1977).
23The following is based on Carsten Bach-Nielsen and Jens Holger Schjørring, Kirkens historie.
vol. 2 (Copenhagen: Hans Reitzels Forlag, 2012).
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priests to own Luther’s sermons and catechism and the Melanchthon’s Loci
Communes and the Augsburg Confession. During the 1600s, the church
entered into a close cooperation with the monarchy. The clerical elite
legitimated the kings’ political position, while the priests carried out
essential administrative tasks such as the registration of births, administration
of laws and decrees, census-taking in connection with tax collection, and so
forth.24
Until 1660, Denmark had an electoral monarch. Nobles and the clergy elite
elected the king. This was changed when, after a coup d’état, Frederik III was
hailed as the heir to the throne. With the Absolutist constitution from 1665—the
King’s Law—the king became de facto head of the church on earth, with
unlimited power over the clergy. The church was thereby robbed of its
independence and its own jurisdiction and was now viewed as a part of the
state. Christianity, in its Lutheran incarnation, was the state-bearing and
state-legitimating religion. The argumentation was theocratic. The king ruled
as sovereign, together with God alone. In return, the priests received
enhanced social position by being made into royal officials.25
Within the absolutist state church, the next 150 years revealed changing
theological-religious movements (pietism and later on, Enlightenment ideas),
which challenged the dominant power relations and the church’s state-
legitimating function. In greatly simplified terms, one can say that the first
part of the nineteenth century saw a conflict between “the old system” that
fought against congregations, priests, and evangelical movements that rose
up against the state-church order, and a new era based more on popular
movements and a dawning churchly view of freedom.
The democratic June constitution of 1849 introduced religious freedom. The
cohesion of the state-church order and civil rights, which had marked
absolutism, ceased. The Folkekirke, the People’s Church, replaced the state
church. The 1849 constitution declares that “The Evangelical Lutheran
church is the Danish People’s Church and is supported as such by the
state.”26 The formulation reflected the idea there is no equality of religion
because the state supported the People’s Church. The vast majority of the
population were de facto members as the constitution, in a later paragraph,
adds that “the constitution of the People’s Church is ordered by law.” It is
the so-called “promissory paragraph,” which means that the church must
have its own constitutional organ. However, agreement has never been
24Hans Henrik Rode and Klaus Petersen, “Kirke og stat i 1600-tallet,” Kirkehistoriske Samlinger
(1996), 63–100.
25Knudsen, “Tilblivelsen af den universalistiske velfærdsstat” 20–64.
26Danish Constitution of 1849, chapter 1, § 3. See: http://danmarkshistorien.dk/leksikon-og-
kilder/vis/materiale/danmarks-riges-grundlov-af-5-juni-1849-junigrundloven/#indhold1.
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reached about this; hence, the formulation reappears in the revised constitution
from 1953.
The Ministry of Ecclesiastical Affairs administers the People’s Church, but
the ministry deals only with the clergy’s official duties (for example, the
registration of births) and with economic matters relating to the church. It
does not interfere in matters pertaining to religious interpretation or
preaching. Within this area, bishops and church officials can take up
controversial cases with an individual vicar, although this is extremely rare
and normally causes quite a sensation. The Danish church has no synod-like
institutions (as in other countries) which could issue guidelines or represent
the official standpoint of the church vis-a-vis issues of principle and political
matters. The Danish People’s Church is thus a kind of umbrella organization,
under which one can find several very different interpretations of the nature
and meaning of Christianity. In this article, we will focus on four significant
groups within the Danish People’s Church: Inner Mission, Grundtvigianism,
Kirkeligt Centrum (“Church Center”), and Tidehverv (“Epoch”). We also
discuss the importance of Christian philanthropy and more independent
theological thinkers.
“The Association of Inner Mission” (Inner Mission) was established in the
early 1850s with the dual goal of maintaining the church and of “awakening
life into those who are sleeping in sin.” After a somewhat chaotic beginning,
the young priest Vilhelm Bech took charge of the movement, and in 1861
re-named it the “Churchly Association for Inner Mission in Denmark.”27
Inner Mission was strictly organized with a self-supplementing national
board. Great emphasis was placed on the distinction between the unbelievers
and the faithful. The movement was marked by factionalism between the
national mission and, especially, the Inner Mission in Copenhagen, which
stood for a more socially engaged and open line, with significant emphasis
on Christian philanthropy and social work. Particularly, Harald Stein
emphasized the special conditions that prevailed in the capital city. The
Church could not focus on the spreading of God’s word alone. It also had to
carry out “the work of love,” so that it did not lose contact with the most
disadvantaged segment of the population. Beck attacked Stein, seeing
priests’ evangelizing and religious duties that engaged in social issues as
dangerous. Their main work should be the message of conversion and
salvation for the repentant sinner.
Along with Inner Mission, Grundtvigianism also played a role as a
predominant stream of thought in Danish religious life. Grundtvigianism is a
social, cultural and ideological doctrine inspired by the theologian and poet
27Kurt E. Larsen, En bevægelse i bevægelse. Indre Mission i Danmark 1861–2011 (Copenhagen:
Lohses Forlag, 2011).
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N. F. S. Grundtvig, with the emphasis on emotion and sincerity that marked the
first half of the 1800s.28Grundtvigianism has taken on many forms and has had
great influence on the understanding of politics, society, popular spirit
( folkelighed), and religious belief. Its key features have been the separation
between religious belief and political conviction, emphasis on church
freedom and the “living word,” that is, the oral dissemination, and the
specific, concrete community. It is not until around 1860 that one can speak
of Grundtvigianism as a movement whose “bright Christianity” was seen in
contrast to the “dark Christianity” organized within Inner Mission. This
tendency garnered support from many segments of the population, but its
main adherents were found among the relatively well-to-do farmer class. The
cultural and ideological significance of Grundtvigianism in the 1800s was
related to its association with this farmer group and its growing influence at
many social levels, especially in the folk high school (that is, adult
education) and agricultural cooperative movements. The difference between
Inner Mission and Grundtvigianism was also partly political, because
conservative tendencies came to dominate Inner Mission, while
Grundtvigianism became linked to the liberal agrarian party, Venstre. Within
both movements, however, there were hawks and more pragmatically
minded members, where for example, the “Left Grundtvigianism” tendency
placed much emphasis on political and cultural questions (especially freedom
of thought) and sought to exempt the priests from surveillance by the
bishops, opening the possibility for congregations to select their own priests
and psalm books, for civil marriage, and so forth. In order to combat these
fragmentary tendencies, the rank and file Grundtvigians created the Church
Society of 1898 (Kirkeligt Samfund af 1898). The main goal of the Church
Society was to protect church unity in order to counter the divisive forces.
At the religious level, Grundtvigianism has been decisive for the notion of
the Danish People’s Church as an inclusive church, which rests on the
individual’s faith and recognizes both the priests’ freedom to interpret the
faith and the churchgoer’s freedom to choose the congregation and priest
that suits their own faith. Politically, Grundtvigianism played a crucial role
in the modern Danish understanding of popular rule and its administration
through pragmatically interpreted ideals of freedom and free thinking.
Nevertheless, there were also those who desired a more conciliatory tone
between the parties, so that emphasis could be placed upon church unity and
Christian faith. This group at times referred to itself as “the Third Stance”
(den tredje retning). In 1904, this centrist group established Church Center
28A. M. Allchin, N.F.S. Grundtvig: An Introduction to His Life and Work (Aarhus: Aarhus
University Press, 1997); Jes Fabricius Møller, Grundtvigianisme i det 20. Århundrede
(Copenhagen: Vartov, 2005).
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(Kirkeligt Centrum), which never obtained the same popularity as the two
larger tendencies. Among priests and theologians, the effort at brokering
became a forum for several larger church debates and confrontations during
the early years of the twentieth century. These debates focused on the role of
church councils, church constitutions, priests’ doctrinal freedom, and the
authority of the bishops.
Tidehverv (“time-recruiting,” “Epoch”) arose in 1926 as an intellectual youth
rebellion within the Christian student organization.29 Tidehverv became the
name of the journal published by a group of younger theologians with the
prison chaplain Niels Ivar Heje at the forefront. A common theological
foundation, from the German theologian Rudolf Bultmann and the Swiss
theologian Karl Barth, marked Tidehverv. It also promoted the
“demythologization” of the idea of an absolute difference between God and
Man that became the core of Tidehverv thinking, which also found clear
inspiration from Søren Kirkegaard. Existential theology became the
counterweight to the established Christianity, which emphasized the
individual human being’s moral and Christian conduct of life. Tidehverv was
a rebellion against the church establishment, Grundtvigianism, and Inner
Mission, all of which were regarded as trying to erase the distinction
between God and Man. These latter tendencies sought to allow Man to work
for his own salvation, while Tidehverv saw the individual as a sinner who
could only hope for God’s mercy and could do nothing to ensure their own
salvation. Tidehverv’s views gradually won popularity, and in the 1950s they
were a prominent voice within the Danish church. The rebellion was
therefore also a confrontation with cultural life and humanism, which
Tidehverv theologians viewed as having become an ersatz religion, an effort
to create heaven on earth. This led to a breach between Tidehverv and the
prominent theologian and philosopher Knud Ejler Løgstrup, who believed
that Christian charity (næstekærlighed) had its roots in Man, and that
Christianity and humanism was ultimately the same thing. The dispute
about the relation of Christianity to humanism subsequently came to play a
great role.30
Alongside these theological groupings there was also another and only partly
related distinction referring more to different understandings of church liturgy,
29Torben Bramming, Tidehvervs historie (Copenhagen: Anis, 1993).
30Since the 1980s, Tidehverv—led by clergymen and later parliamentary members Søren Krarup
and Jesper Langballe—has worked closely with the Danish People’s Party and has advocated a
strong anti-immigration and anti-Muslim line. This is a marked shift from earlier decades, when
Tidehverv was politically independent and represented persons from both the political right and
left. See Torben Bramming, “Tidehverv og velfærdsstaten—generationers kritik,” in I himlen
således også på jorden? Danske kirkefolk om velfærdsstaten og det moderne samfund, eds. Nils
Gunder Hansen, Jørn Henrik Petersen, and Klaus Petersen (Odense: University of Southern
Denmark Press, 2010), 101–128.
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such that the “high church,” for whom the church was an institution and the
correct liturgy was crucial, can be said to lie to the right, while the “low
church” leaned more to the political center. Some Grundtvigian priests,
because of the emphasis placed on the congregation, baptism, and Holy
Communion can be called “high church,” while Inner Mission and Tidehverv
generally have “low church” status.
A distinct aspect of the church-state relationship concerned the social
problems of the Danish society. The clergy and other church people have
been an active and at times even dominant force in the Danish socio-political
debate, beginning with the poor laws of the eighteenth and nineteenth
centuries31 through the first wave of socio-political reforms in the 1890s.32
From the outset, there was internal disagreement whether church related
social work (that is philanthropy, charity, and the like) was to be an alternative
to state-welfare or to be cooperating and supplementing the public welfare
initiatives. Grundtvig, who also was a member of parliament, was not alone
with his view that public social assistance broke with “the natural relation”
where receiving and contributing were based on voluntariness, gratitude, and
willingness.33 Furthermore, Christian philanthropy and state social policy had
quite different justifications or were based on different conventions. The
Christian philanthropists had from the outset a religious, missionary aim while
state social policy often had as its point of departure a more rational and
partially economic justification.34
From the late nineteenth century until the beginning of the twentieth century,
Christian philanthropy had a distinct autonomy and status as a system parallel
to the emerging public social security system. In that period, Christian
philanthropy had a strong missionary dimension. Gradually, however, as
public welfare policy became institutionalized, philanthropy had less elbow
room, and the conception that philanthropic measures alone could manage
all social issues grew weaker. This created a delicate balance for the
Christian philanthropist. On the one hand, they had to maintain a good
relation to the public welfare system, but, on the other hand, they had to
31Anette Jensen, Fra selvfølge til symbol—ægteskabet i krydsfeltet mellem stat, kirke og
befolkning i 1800-tallet (PhD diss. University of Southern Denmark, 2003); Hans Chr. Johansen,
Befolkningsudvikling og familiestruktur i det 18. århundrede (Odense: Odense
Universitetsforlag, 1975).
32See Jørn Henrik Petersen, Klaus Petersen, and Niels Finn Christiansen, eds., Dansk
Velfærdshistorie. Frem mod socialsstaten, vol. 1, Perioden 1536–1898 (Odense: Syddansk
Universitetsforlag, 2010).
33Kim Arne Pedersen, “Grundtvig, det sociale spørgsmål og velfærdssamfundet,” in I himlen
således på jorden?, 76–83.
34It should however be emphasized that for certain key players, such as the economist Harald
Westergaard, Christian ethics and the rational state social policy apparently went hand in hand.
See Lars Andersen, Balancekunstneren. Harald Westergaard og det sociale spørgsmål 1878–
1907 (Odense: Syddansk Universitetsforlag, 2011).
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maintain their Christian identity and autonomy. In a report from 1904, the
clergyman and child welfare philanthropist Alfred Kaae noted precisely this
delicate balance:
To get to the heart of the matter, one has to have a close relation to the
municipal authorities, which directly and indirectly have so many
unhappily situated children to take care of [. . . .] and serve them by, for a
suitable remuneration, placing and supervising the children and supporting
their upbringing. Despite this, a foster association must not become a
municipal association, but must assert itself as a free charitable association
that also accepts other children than those who are under public assistance.35
In the first decades of the twentieth century, a compromise was established
between Christian philanthropy and state welfare—cooperation between
equal partners to ensure efficiency and coordination and to maintain the
work and insight that existed in the more professional section of Christian
philanthropy. This change developed because the philanthropic sector to a
growing degree came to rely on financial support from state and
municipalities. This altered the balance of power between the two parties, as
financial support and regulation normally went hand in hand. Even though
the Social Reform Act of 1933 was based on the idea of social rights (as
opposed to alms based on local discretion) and strengthened the statist
character of Danish social legislation it also explicitly stated that
philanthropic and other voluntary initiatives were supposed to play an
important role in the future. This was most visibly the case within the field
of family policy and child welfare. However, in the post-1933 phase the state
tightened its grip on Christian philanthropy, which to a greater extent
became a welfare producer on the premises of the state. The main ideologue
of Danish Christian philanthropy, Alfred Th. Jørgensen, realized this when,
in 1939, he stated that
the stronger factor in the cooperation, the state, has at times, in gentle or at
times less gentle ways, taken over management and command. It often
merely starts with the state wishing to introduce a certain amount of
supervision of the private institutions, but gradually evolves into the state
issuing directives, and ends with the state either purely administratively or
via legislative powers taking over management of the voluntary work.36
3511. Aarsberetning for de danske Plejehjemsforeninger for Aaret 1904 med særlig Beretning om
Plejehjemforeningen for Svendborg Amt (Copenhagen, 1905): 30. See also the summary of the
lecture by Pastor S. H. Nissen and the convention on child issues in Meddelelser fra Kristelig
Forening til vildfarne Børns Redning, June 3, 1901.
36Alfred Th. Jørgensen, Filantropi. Vejledning i offentlig Forsorg og privat Velgørenhed for
Begyndere (Copenhagen: O. Lohses Forlag, 1939), 135.
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Jørgensen and like-minded church men maintained the difference between the
right based public welfare system and the more normative Christian social work
anchored in Christian love of one’s fellow-man; however ideas about the
Christian alternative came under pressure.37 The fast growth of the welfare
state especially after 1945 and what we might call the “ideology” of public
welfare became a fundamental challenge for the church people: should they
embrace, accept, or reject the modern welfare state?
II. THE DANISH WELFARE DEBATE AFTER 1945
When we move forward to the post-war period, the welfare views of church
people cannot be viewed independently of the general welfare state
discussion that took place in Denmark from the early 1950s onward, when
the concept “welfare state” gained a foothold. This discussion culminated
between 1954 and 1957, at the same time as the political clashes over the
introduction of the universal old age pension. With this connection, two
observations are worth mentioning. First, the term “welfare state” had a late
entrance into Danish public rhetoric, appearing long after it did in the United
States and Great Britain, where the discussion mushroomed in the years
1949–1951. Parts of the Danish discussion, therefore, may be directly or
indirectly inspired by the Anglo-Saxon discussion, which also included
“church people.” Second, critical voices initially dominated the debate in
Denmark (like that in the United States).38 These criticisms expressed three
broad themes. One was liberal, economically conditioned, and characterized
by a fear that the welfare state would lead to uncontrolled growth of the
public sector and increased taxation with negative side-effects. Certain
church people also mentioned this theme, indicating that the boundary
between religious and more political arguments could be blurred. The second
critique was of a moral character: the welfare state was seen as a threat to
the individual and civil society. This theme included a general fear of
modernization in which Christianity was derided as mere humanism. Here
the contribution made by church people was, of course, considerable. The
third critique of the welfare state was Marxist: the welfare state was viewed
as an integral part of the capitalist system and, hence, an instrument of the
ruling class.
37See for example Ludvig Bech, “Hjem, Barn, Stat,” Børnesagens Tidende 34, no. 19 (1939):
308.
38Klaus Petersen, “Velfærdsstaten i dansk politisk retorik,” Tidsskrift for velferdsforskning 4
(2001): 16–28; Jørn Henrik Petersen, Niels Finn Christiansen, and Klaus Petersen, “Kapitel 2.
Det socialpolitiske idélandskab,” in Dansk Velfærdshistorie., vol. 3, Velfærdsstaten i Støbeskeen.
Perioden 1933–1956, eds. Jørn Henrik Petersen, Klaus Petersen, and Niels Finn Christiansen
(Odense: Syddansk Universitetsforlag 2012), 133–151.
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Naturally, there were also those who spoke in favor of the welfare state—
especially those connected with the Social Democratic Party and Social
Liberals (Det radikale Venstre), who had a history of close cooperation with
the Social Democrats. The two parties found it quite difficult, however, to
translate the content of the concept into a positive program and vision. The
overall picture in the 1950s and early 1960s, therefore, is surprisingly
critical. Supporters of the welfare state were very much on the defensive. In
retrospect, this seems rather strange—not least in light of the subsequent
political consensus that saw the welfare state as a positive name for a new
era: “make good times better” was the slogan on a Social Democratic
election poster in 1960. Among the “church people,” there were many critics
who feared that the changes would weaken the role of the church and its
status in society. This was certainly also the case in Denmark.
III. BISHOP EYVIND BERGGRAV AND THE NORWEGIAN WELFARE STATE
The church discussion of the welfare state was far from being an exclusively
Danish exercise. Similar discussions about the relationship between church
and state had already started in the interwar years among German
theologians,39 and from the late 1920s through the following decades, there
was a lively debate, particularly among British church people.40 For
instance, Bishop William Temple published several best-selling books on the
role of the state in modern society, and it is no coincidence that welfare
research has credited Bishop Temple with coining or popularizing the
concept “the welfare state.”41 In Britain, this discussion also continued after
1945, as exemplified by the 1948 Lambeth Conference, which brought
together 349 Anglican bishops to the Archbishop of Canterbury’s residence
at Lambeth Palace.42 Triggered by the emerging Cold War, a major theme at
the Lambeth meeting was the relationship between the individual, the state,
39Emil Brunner, Das Gebot und die Ordnungen: Entwurf einer protestantisch-theologischen
Ethik (Tübingen: Mohr, 1932); Paul Althaus, “Zum gegenwärtigen lutherischen
Staatsverständnis,” in Die Kirche und das Staatsproblem in der Gegenwart, eds. Paul Althaus,
Emil Brunner, and Vigo Auguste Demant (Berlin: Furche Verlag, 1934).
40Grimley, Citizenship, Community and the Church of England.
41See for example Kathleen Woodroofe, “The making of the welfare state in England: A
summary of its origin and development,” Journal of Social History 1 (1968): 303–324; Maurice
Bruce, The Coming of the Welfare State (London: Batsford, 1961); Rodney Lowe, The Welfare
State in Britain since 1945 (London: Routledge, 2005). However Temple’s understanding of the
term “welfare state” was different from the post-1945 understanding of the term as meaning
social security system; see Jørn Henrik Petersen and Klaus Petersen, “Divergence and
Confusion: The Origins of the Term ‘Welfare State’ in Germany and Britain 1840–1940,”
Journal of European Social Policy 23, no. 1 (2013): 37–51.
42Norman, Church and Society in England.
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and the church. One of the resolutions emerging from the meeting addressed
the relationship between the church and the development of a welfare state:
We believe that the state is under moral law of God, and is intended by him to
be an instrument for human welfare. We therefore welcome the growing
concern and care of the modern state for its citizens, and call upon Church
members to accept their own political responsibility and to co-operate
with the state and its officers in their work.43
Even though the Danish church people were not present at the Lambeth
Conference, and even though the Danish church did not issue Encyclical
Letters and resolutions, it seems that the British debate had some influence
on the Danish one.
It was, though, via Norway that the discussion came into Denmark.44 As
early as 1948, the Christian newspaper Vårt Land (Our Country) had an
editorial entitled “The Welfare State” which argued rights and justice could
never be a completely satisfactory replacement for compassion.45 This theme
was raised several times in the paper’s editorials, all of which expressed the
view that social need was fundamentally spiritual and moral and, therefore,
could not be combated exclusively by material means. In 1951, the
prominent Norwegian theologian Olav Valen-Sendstad brought the welfare
state under debate.46 He praised the welfare state as a “social security state”
that was based on a materialistic ideal of security. But this state could not
stand on its own, he said. It needed an anchoring and a depth that only
Christianity could provide. It was not the expansion of the welfare state that
worried him, but the values on which it was founded. Neither liberty,
equality, nor fraternity could have a normative effect on society unless they
were anchored in Christianity. In themselves, they could not justify or
legitimate a common morality. Precisely for this reason, the welfare state
was in danger of degenerating into a totalitarian system that, via coercion,
would supplant religiously based morality.
The welfare state is an expression of the titanic attempt to create a heavenly
kingdom on earth by uniting and realising the ideals of liberty, equality and
fraternity. The welfare state thus represents a climax of modern political
thought, carrying all the trademarks of the West European secularisation
that wants to retain principal Christian moral ideals whilst freeing itself
from and doing away with every Christian religious outlook.
43Lambeth Conference 1948, Encyclical Letter from the Bishops together with the Resolutions
and Reports (London: Society for Promoting Christian Knowledge, 1948), 29.
44This section is based on Tønnesen, ”Et trygt og godt hjem for alle”?, 263–279.
45Vårt Land, August 5, 1948.
46Vårt Land, January 11, 12, 13, and 15, 1951.
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Even though Valen-Sendstad’s position, as a Christian, was positively
disposed toward social security and the welfare state as concepts, he
worried that the state was deifying itself. If the welfare state project was not
to be derailed, it had to recognize the true position of the church in society
as the moral and spiritual educator of the people. If the welfare state did not
recognize the church’s God-given right and duty to manage issues of
spiritual and moral education that affect the soul of the people, or recognize
members of the church as rightful practitioners of a spiritual authority that
the state is not to interfere with, then the church would have to adopt a
skeptical attitude to the welfare state project. As with the discussion in
Great Britain, the stage was now set for an open cultural struggle between
church and state.
We find a similar line of argument used by the renowned Norwegian bishop
Eivind Berggrav. In his 1945 book Staten og mennesket (The State and the
Individual), Berggrav advanced a critique of Western intellectual life and
cultural history. One such criticism he called “the line of sovereignty.” The
state, he said, was attempting to be a law unto itself, since it tells all
“unauthorised persons” to stay within their “own areas.” The state refuses to
allow that which is sacred to apply to its own area, even though it applies to
other areas. The other critique he called “the line of secularization.” Here
Berggrav bemoans the fact that the sacred is constantly toned down, not only
as binding on the state but also as a cultural reality. The line of sovereignty
leads to a separation of the sphere of the state from that of the sacred, while
the line of secularization tends toward denying everything other than what is
materially real. The inter-war ecclesiastical discussion of the state and the
limits of state power strongly influenced the Norwegian bishop—along with
many Danish church people. They attacked the Lutheran doctrine of the two
kingdoms, and the question of the limits of state power was becoming
increasingly important in the discussions. For those who argued in favor of
limits on the sphere of state power, the constitutional state was the answer.
For them, it was crucial that the Lutheran doctrine had been formulated in a
completely different historical context with a clearly Christian authority,
which made it inconceivable to consider the possible right of Christians to
resist a totalitarian state power that would act as providence and place itself
in God’s stead. This group was especially worried about the ever-increasing
state influence on education and socialization in the broadest sense. It also
saw a real danger in a welfare state that “at a superficial glance” might seem
extremely attractive—also from a Christian point of view. Admittedly, such a
state might seem to be democratic, humanitarian, compassionate, and
governed by welfare, but it had within it the seeds of a totalitarian and
completely secularized state. They considered this kind of state, however
benign, a threat to a free church.
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Berggrav’s speech at the Lutheran World Congress, held in Hannover in
1952, gave his views considerable clout.47 In the first part of this
presentation, Berggrav dealt with the church’s duty to obey in relation to the
state. While this position had very much to do with the actual problems
facing Eastern European churches with regard to their communist rulers,48 it
was also influenced by the preceding Norwegian church struggle. Berggrav’s
critique of the welfare state was part of his general skepticism regarding the
development of the modern state. According to Berggrav, Luther’s teachings
assumed that the state was founded on the rule of law, and that the sword
was thus the implement of justice. An authority based on tyranny and
lawlessness could not be recognized. Hence, there was no demand for
obedience under every circumstance and toward every authority. In
accordance with his understanding of St. Paul, it was justice and not power
that underlay one’s duty to obey. If, however, there was a constitutional
society, Christian ideal demands could not be imposed on the secular state
because a Christian did not possess better knowledge and was not a better
“doer” than others in political matters. It was nevertheless a Christian and a
church task to always expose the authority to a litmus test in which its deeds
were held up against God’s word—a view that also played a major role in
the Anglican Church.
Berggrav’s main point was that in actual fact there were not two kingdoms
but only one: God’s. Hence, there were not two authorities that had to be
obeyed. Obedience to God was unconditional, whereas obedience to the
authority of “this world” was conditional. It applied only if the authority
represented a constitutional (democratic) state. Justice ranked above power,
and if justice was trampled underfoot, a demonic state of affairs existed that
justified the right to resist.
In the second part of his Hannover Speech, Berggrav turned more
directly against the welfare state in its Nordic form. He claimed that the
power state, emphasized by William Temple49 as a counterpart to the welfare
state, was flourishing in many countries. Typical of the post-war period
was a combination of both types of state. It is no coincidence that there
seem to be strong links between Berggrav’s and Temple’s argumentation.
In connection with his work on the “Nordic Peace Plan,” Berggrav had
47Eivind Berggrav, “Stat og kirke i dag etter luthersk syn, Foredrag på det lutherske
verdensforbunds møte i Hannover 1952,” Kirke og Kultur 57 (1952): 449–467.
48Before the conference, the Hungarian bishop Lajos Ordass, Vice President of The Lutheran
World Federation, had been placed under house arrest. Many East Germans had been refused
exit permits, and there were no participants from Czechoslovakia and Poland.
49William Temple, Christianity and the State (London: Macmillan, 1928); William Temple,
Christianity and Social Order (London: Penguin, 1941).
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visited London in December 1940, where he had met Temple, then Archbishop
of York.50
According to Berggrav, the welfare state was a secular state that was eager to
take the place of Providence, wishing to replace the Nazi Weltanschauung by
education to a “democratic sentiment.” From Berggrav’s point of view, this
meant that totalitarianism was also found in democracy. What was
problematic about the welfare state was that it assigned itself a superior role
and permeated all areas of life—threatening that the church would be ousted
from social life. This risk made the welfare state demonic. While Luther had
written in an age threatened by political chaos, the present day was
characterized by a far too well ordered and totally regulatory state.
What the gospel wanted to give the poor or the sick in the form of a gift or a
favor, the welfare state wanted to provide as a right. For Berggrav, this was a
problem because the voluntary “giving of a gift” and the receiving of the gift
created ties between the classes and thereby contributed to maintaining a
community. In voluntary gift-giving, responsibility was in the hands of the
individual. To replace the gift by a right would be a threat to social work
because authority would be based solely on conditions formulated by the
state. The risk, then, was that the state would assume the role of an almighty
father or an omnipotent state. Berggrav feared that the secularized welfare
state would supplant Christianity and replace the state in God’s stead.51 It
would rule over the conscience of the individual, which would be
orchestrated in such a way that everyone acted in accordance with the state
way of life. Morality would be defined by the state, not the church.
The advantage of the welfare state was that it was based on popular opinion.
For that reason, in combating the state’s hubris, the church, in its spiritual
struggle, had to shape public opinion. The church had to demand full
freedom to preach its gospel and the right to exercise goodness and
compassion. It must never become a tool of power politics. Bringing up
children must be the parents’ responsibility, and the state must never stand
alone in defining good and evil.52 Berggrav’s skepticism toward the welfare
state reflected his conception of the state as a secular, materialistic project
that interfered with the church’s good relations with the Norwegian Labour
Party. Berggrav followed this with other statements, such as the critical
50Gunnar Heiene, Eivind Berggrav, En biografi (Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 1992); Aud V.
Tønnesen also mentions that Temple was known in Norway as a result of his involvement in the
ecumenical work of the 1930s; see Tønnesen, “Et trygt og godt hjem for alle”?, 286.
51When there was talk of secularization in general and of the secularized welfare state in
particular, the concept was used more or less as a synonym for de-Christianization and the
diminishing role of Christianity as a basis for common values in society.
52This point of view had been very influential in the Norwegian church struggle; and was also
strongly emphasized by Temple; see Heiene, Eivind Berggrav, 345.
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article about welfare and sentiment, in which he combined his moral critique
with more economically related points of view, based on the concept of
incentive.53
IV. BERGGRAV’S CRITIQUE AS AN ECHO IN THE DANISH DEBATE
Eivind Berggrav was well known in Danish church circles, and a number of his
papers were also published in Denmark.54 It is worth noting that in 1952,
Præsteforeningens Blad, the official organ of the Danish clergy, published
Berggrav’s much cited lecture at The Lutheran World Federation meeting in
Hannover in 1952, where he explicitly dealt with the welfare state.55 His
critical article on welfare and sentiment56 was published in the newspaper
Vestkysten.57 Berggrav’s thinking influenced several positions in the broad
Danish church.
Echoes of Berggrav’s views can be seen in an article in the parish magazine
for Helligåndskirken (Church of the Holy Spirit) in Copenhagen, written by its
vicar, Svend Lerfeldt, D.D., who was a known specialist on Luther.58 After
having talked about the state’s exploitation of its citizens59 and the tendency
of citizens to become slaves of the state, Lerfeldt concludes his article as
follows:
One can clearly make out the contours of a state where people are degraded
into being a workforce that is directed as desired, as if one were dealing with
cattle—without taking into account if the individual becomes rootless or is
ruined physically and mentally. It calls itself the welfare state, but there is
good reason to ask if the modern state is not becoming a threat to human
welfare. If, in its belief in itself, it is not placing itself on God’s throne.
Other striking examples of Berggrav’s thinking in Denmark can be found in
established church people such as Paul Holt, principal of a college of
education in Århus and the “official” historian of the Inner Mission. In
53Eivind Berggrav, “Velferden og sinnelaget,” Kirke og Kultur 61 (1956): 95–96.
54See the following texts by Eivind Berggrav: “Kirkeperspektiver,” Præsteforeningens Blad 40
(1950): 248–251; “Humanisme og kristendom i dag,” Samtiden 59 (1950): 471–489; “Humanisme
og kristendom i dag,” Præsteforeningens Blad 41 (1951): 533–537; “Stat og kirke i dag etter
luthersk syn, Foredrag på det lutherske verdensforbunds møte i Hannover 1952,” 449–467.
55In December 1950, Berggrav had left the bishopric in Oslo and had thrown himself into
ecumenical work
56Eivind Berggrav, “Velferden og sinnelaget,” Kirke og Kultur 61 (1956): 95–96.
57Eivind Berggrav, “Ansvaret i velfærdsstaten,” Vestkysten, August 10, 1956.
58Cited from the newspaper Sønderjyden, Haderslev, February 2, 1956.
59This formulation was not found in other church people. It only reflects a slightly primitive view
of the taxpayer that is more “vulgar” than what could be found in the economic-liberal criticism
among politicians.
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addition to his theological career, Holt also had been an active politician. In the
1930s, he entered “Danish Unity” (Dansk Samling), a national, anti-
parliamentary, and elitist ideology and quickly became part of the
leadership.60 The organization shared some ideological features with the
fascist movements of the time, but without their violent and anti-democratic
character. In contrast to Nazism, Danish Unity had a strong foundation in
Christianity and the Danish church tradition. After the Nazi occupation of
Denmark in April 1940, Danish Unity expressed criticism of the Danish
government’s recognition of the German occupying power, and this
gradually evolved into illegal activity with a strong connection to the Danish
resistance movement. This resistance activity led to Holt (similar to Berggrav
in Norway) being interned in a Danish prison camp and subsequently
arrested by the Gestapo in 1944. He was sent to the German concentration
camps of Neuengamme and Neu-Versen. After the war, Danish Unity,
inspired by the French Christian Democratic Party, sought to re-launch itself
as representative of a socially responsible Christianity. The party programme
from 1945 also shows clear inspiration from British social economists such
as John Maynard Keynes and William Beveridge. In the parliamentary
election of 1945, Holt became one of Danish Unity’s four representatives in
parliament, and he continued to play a leading role in the party after the
1947 election as well, although Danish Unity failed to gain any seats in
parliament. Theologically, Holt was connected to the Danish Inner Mission,
which had played a key role in the development of Christian charity work in
Denmark. In the post-war period, he stood for both social justice thinking
and a Christian critique of the state.61
In 1955, Holt’s “Christian critique” of the welfare state distinguished
between democracy, which had always striven toward a welfare state—in the
first instance by placing the state as the custodian of liberty (liberalism) and
then by developing social care and protection of the workers (the active,
democratic welfare state)—and the absolute welfare state.62 He linked the
latter to totalitarian-fascist, Nazi, and communist states—societies where the
state is the only active force and is solely responsible for the welfare of its
citizens. In the absolute welfare state, human need is unworthy and human
existence is no longer a matter of destiny, but of politics. Holt argued that
realizing material welfare is not synonymous with human happiness. Holt’s
distinction between a welfare state and an absolute welfare state
corresponded to Berggrav’s idea of the welfare state as a cross between the
60Henrik Lundbak, Staten stærk og folket frit (Copenhagen: Museum Tusculanum, 2001).
61Larsen, Indre Mission, 25–55.
62Paul Holt, “Velfærdsstaten—en historisk analyse og en kristen kritik,” Frihed og Fællesskab 17
(1955): 3–6. See also: Kristeligt Dagblad, December 15, 1955.
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totalitarian and the democratic, with a risk of a movement toward the purely
totalitarian.
According to Holt, the problem of the welfare state, then, is due to the
preaching of Christianity. Via Christianity, new ideals had been brought into
the world that derived from the emphasis on the infinite value of the human
individual. These ideals, according to Holt, were simultaneously the main
source of the welfare state and its fundamental problem. Since Christianity
naturally had to assert its absolute sovereignty, it had to oppose to the
absolute welfare state, in which there is nothing above or on a par with
the state. The state becomes God; politics becomes the religion; and, the
ideology of the state becomes “the doctrine of salvation.”63 If man does not
live by bread alone, he must turn to welfare as the highest ideal—as a
perverted Christian ideal. All attempts to redeem mankind via a welfare state
are doomed to fail, because they rest on a deception. Holt directed his
criticism primarily at the absolute welfare state, but the Danish “approach”
was also deemed problematic. Firstly, because it tended to turn the material
standard of living into a religion and something divine, and was thus
characterized by emptiness and neuroses. Secondly, because it handed over
personal responsibility to the state power while co-responsibility in society
was “depersonalized” (a clearly Berggravian way of thinking). Holt could
therefore support the welfare state insofar as it gave people the security and
freedom of choice valued by the individual. However, Holt rejected the
welfare state when, in its absolute form, it placed itself in God’s stead.
A more welfare-positive position that has Berggrav as its point of departure
is to be found in a radio-transmitted speech given at Nyborg Strand by the later
bishop of Copenhagen, the then general secretary of The Cooperation of Parish
Workers, Willy Westergaard-Madsen (reported in Kristeligt Dagblad, October
18, 1956). With his roots in the Christian-philanthropic tradition he represented
a more pragmatic position and saw the modern welfare state as
a state that feels an obligation to care for the entire population in all its
relations that determine its security, via an economic policy and social
insurance, via efforts to create full employment, via a comprehensive
interest in youth and finally via a cultural program that also takes the
spiritual needs of the population into account.
According to Westergaard-Madsen, developments had long since transferred
social responsibility into the hands of the state. There was no way back, and
it was hard to disapprove of this. It made no sense, he underlined, to discuss
such slogans as “nanny state” and “socialist guardian state”—concepts that
so much typified the American debate in the early 1950s, although there was
63Holt, “Velfærdsstaten,” 3–6.
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good reason to consider the risk of the state usurping responsibility from the
individual.
Westergaard-Madsen was one of the few who attempted to define or
demarcate the welfare state, placing emphasis on the state’s obligation to
ensure—and responsibility for ensuring—the social security of the
population. Without giving it any negative emphasis, Westergaard-Madsen
also included the interest for youth and the spiritual needs of the population.
He adopted a balanced view of the welfare state, distancing himself from a
discussion at the level of slogans. He indicated specific areas meriting closer
attention. In his speech, Westergaard-Madsen clearly made use of Berggrav’s
contribution from 1952, which he had heard as a participant at the Lutheran
World Congress in Hannover.64 This can also be seen from formulations
that, at times, had been taken directly from Berggrav’s speech. Westergaard-
Madsen believed that Berggrav was correct in some of his criticisms, but he
could not agree with the highly bombastic and categorical delivery. One
could not criticize the welfare state for focusing on material welfare. It was
not the state that was to preach that man could not live by bread alone.
Hence, he proposed a division of labor, with the state ensuring that the
individual had solid material ground under his feet, while the church took
place of social and spiritual needs.
This did not prevent him from raising a number of important questions and
pointing out various risks: the risk of life in society becoming impersonal, and
of the individual being considered a means of production, the risk of
bureaucratization, and the risk of a weakening of Christian social work and
of church involvement in social work generally. This was not a fundamental
critique of the welfare state, nor was it an attempt to assert that there was
something latent in welfare democracy that could assume a totalitarian
nature. It was, rather, an unobtrusive point that there were problems that
ought to be considered when seeking to further develop the welfare state
system.
As we shall see in the following, neither the critical Holt nor the more
pragmatic Westergaard-Madsen were alone in their views. Danish church
people included both sharp critics and proponents of moving toward a
welfare state. Holt and others had formal links to the political party system
and it is of course not possible to disentangle religious and political
motivation when assessing the intentions of individuals. What we can say is,
that in these discussions religion seemed to play a more important role than
political ideology and we do not find any uniform Lutheran thinking about
the welfare state.
64Malmgart, Ingen skal gå sulten i seng, 62.
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V. TIDEHVERV: A CLEAR “NO” TO THE WELFARE STATE
With a belief in the importance of heredity and environment for personal
development it is not appropriate—so wrote the vicar of Tversted, Johs V.
Sørensen65—to talk about responsibility and blame in the welfare state,
which does not leave any decision of importance to the individual. The
welfare state derives from the view that man is simply a product of heredity
and environment, but such a view makes the individual as unaccountable
and helpless as a baby. Society is “to blame” for everything, and that is why
the state makes itself the guardian of the country’s citizens. And this does
not contribute to personal happiness and—packed in cotton and bound hand
and foot—the individual seems not to appreciate the well-meaning efforts
made to develop a brave new world. It is a point of view heavily influenced
by the group of Danish theologians called “Tidehverv.” A human being can
never be the intersection of heredity and environment, but must always be
the center of action that must be responsible for his/her own life to God and
his/her neighbor.
Prior to the Nazi occupation of Denmark, the Tidehverv group had not
devoted much attention to the modern secularized state. The relation to the
modern world was only put on the agenda after the war66 and it found
expression in skepticism toward the cultural phenomena that underlay the
welfare ideology. This is important because at that time, Tidehverv was an
influential intellectual factor, if not the dominant tendency, in Danish church
life.
As early as 1949, Tage Wilhjelm had pointed to the struggle between three
philosophies of life: positivism/materialism, humanism/idealism and
Christianity. It was precisely positivism and humanism in general and the
welfare state in particular that were in the Tidehverv line of fire. Positivism
came under attack, because Tidehverv saw it as the ideological foundation of
the welfare state. The indictment against positivism was that it was based on
a premise that it was scientifically possible to justify both political solutions
to problems that positivism itself had helped foster as well as society’s
norms and values. Much of the criticism made by the “church people”
reflected their view that the welfare state represented an expanding state that
shifted boundaries between the “religious” and the “public” domains, based
on norms justified by positivism and solutions consisting of material welfare.
Seen from Tidehverv’s point of view, the welfare state had become a false
idol in people’s consciousness. In their belief in material progress, society
65Johs. V. Sørensen, “Kan vi gøre for, at vi er, som vi er?,” Vendsyssel Tidende, November 28,
1956.
66Bramming, Tidehvervs historie, 84.
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put their trust in the welfare state and expected all good things to flow from it.
The supporters of the welfare state naively believed—according to Tidehverv—
that there were political solutions to all questions, provided that experts were
given a free hand to implement the most functional solution models. There is
a clear link here with Berggrav’s idea of the demonization of the modern state.
Johs. Horstmann, who replaced K. Olesen Larsen as vicar of Esajaskirken in
1964, was the person who most clearly articulated Tidehverv’s view of the
welfare state. Horstmann was what one could call a “straight talker.” The
welfare state, Horstmann argued,67 can use the church in its purely
“technical” humanitarian efforts and to provide political/social life with a
religious buttress, which is similar to Berggrav’s idea of Christianity as
camouflage. This support was intended to justify society’s will to provide
civil security and physical and mental wellbeing as the absolute goal of
human life, which is every man’s duty to seek to attain. And this can be
done, Horstmann and Tidehverv said, if the church is willing to accept
society’s dream of political and social welfare as the true aim of human life
or if it is willing to identify the command to love one’s neighbor with that of
working for one’s fellow man and thereby also for one’s own earthly
happiness. It is perfectly possible, Tidehverv argued, for “socially oriented
clergymen”—especially those seeking to make a career for themselves—to
throw themselves into such a venture, but if they do so, they will not be
representing the “cause” of the church.
According to Horstmann, when an authority imagines that they are able to
organize life in society precisely as they feel inclined, to reshape society
according to their own conception of what human social life should be like,
then that authority is placing itself in God’s stead and ceases to be the power
that serves God. That authority becomes demonic because it seeks to deify
human values. Conversely, it is the task of the church to take the belief in
politics away from people, so that they do not believe they can find salvation
for themselves and others through politics. Once again, there is a clear
parallel with Berggrav’s views. When the church preaches the gospel, it
makes each person responsible for his neighbor’s earthly necessities of life.
It is the social task of the church, then, to make sure that no one commits
idolatry when it comes to responsibility for one’s neighbor. It is not the task
of the church’s social work and charity to do away with poverty. Nor may it
call on the authorities to do so. Rather, the church should point to everyone’s
poor neighbor and make it clear to the individual that he or she is
responsible for that person. If this message is not preached, care of the poor
will become a divine act—a badly concealed form of guardianship, where
one seeks to change the poor person, re-create him in one’s own image and
67Johs Horstmann, “Kirkens politiske og sociale opgave I,” Tidehverv, 35, no. 1–2 (1961): 1–8.
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elevate him to one’s own level. This is not service. It is tyranny. And the
modern welfare state has precisely this tendency to turn into a demonic
tyrant because it overestimates what it is capable of giving. According to the
Tidehverv group, the welfare state becomes a chance for the strong to rejoice
in their strength because of the weakness of the weak. One must serve the
poor person for the person he is and where he finds himself, give him what
he needs because he is in need of it. We must not try to turn the poor person
into a happy, harmonious and satisfied individual, nor seek to give his life
meaning. The desire to do away with poverty—or, more correctly, wanting
to do away with the poor—and wanting to leave them to their own devices
in their poverty are equally demonic.
The welfare state, Horstmann said,68 is not a political but a religious
phenomenon, because it promotes the faith in the welfare state as the
absolute goal of humanity. In that sense, the political demand made by
the welfare state is totalitarian. Beneath the gleaming, smiling face of the
welfare state, which wants the perfection of mankind, lurks despair. The
church’s effort to create a minimum of humanity in an inhuman world makes
it inhuman. For this reason, the church must say loud and clear that the aim
of the welfare state is destined to fail. The welfare state’s responsibility for
one’s neighbor is seen as justified on religious and Christian grounds. If the
church does not protest in such a situation, it is guilty of becoming a
guarantor and legitimator of the welfare state—of supplying it with divine
authority. Horstmann refers to this as “social pietism”—not Christianity.
Clergyman (and later parliamentarian) Søren Krarup further developed this
point of view from 1960 onward in several books and articles. For Krarup,
the welfare state and democracy had become a religion, because those in
power wanted to deify themselves.69
VI. CHURCH SOCIALWORK, PHILANTHROPY, AND THE WELFARE STATE
One of the areas where the church and the welfare state really came into
practical contact with each other was the church’s social work. This practical
social work had begun in earnest during the final decades of the nineteenth
century, and from the early twentieth century had become increasingly
organized and professionalized.70
Generally speaking, philanthropists placed more importance on practical
action than on theological discussions. Not surprisingly, the pragmatic views
68Johs. Horstmann, “Velfærdskristendom,” Tidehverv 35, no. 8–9 (1961): 61–75.
69See for example: Søren Krarup, “Folkekirke og velfærdssamfund,” Tidehverv 41, no. 1–2
(1967): 15–19.
70Lützen, Byen tæmmes; Malmgart, Ingen skal gå sulten i seng.
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articulated by Westergaard-Madsen concerning the role of church social work
in the welfare state exerted an influence on the Danish church people.71 Since
the welfare state had an underlying secular set of values, many church people
saw the welfare state as having an undermining effect on church social work,
even though many of those involved in such work saw a possibility for
greater interaction between church-based social work and public efforts. This
was the position adopted during the inter-war years by the chairman of The
Cooperation of Parish Workers, Alfred Th. Jørgensen,72 a position
maintained by philanthropic leaders during the post-war years. It is clear,
however, that the extremely rapid growth of the welfare state also led to
criticism from those involved in philanthropic work.
Even before Westergaard-Madsen’s radio-transmitted lecture (1952), Jens
Jacob Jensen had expressed anxiety that the church’s social work would be
impeded by the expansion of the state’s welfare activity, fearing that welfare
policies would promote an already advancing secularization. He was clearly
influenced by Berggrav’s above mentioned criticisms:
The welfare state, however, is a secularised state that believes it has the right
to intervene everywhere in human life. Welfare states will also rule over
people’s consciences. Young people must be brought up in the way the
state regards as being right and proper.73
Other voices also spoke out. In Indre Missions Tidende, J. D. Christensen
emphasized that humane help lacked the word that refreshes the soul and
that quickens hope in sorrow and death, that God’s heart is behind it, not
just human sympathy.74 For that reason, church social work could not be
replaced by public care. Inner Mission historically had played an important
role in establishing church-based Christian philanthropy and insisted on the
importance of this also in the era of the welfare state. Public care (that is, the
welfare state) is pharisaic, according to Christensen; it does not bear witness
to God’s goodness, but to its own. The welfare state does not spring from
humility, but pride. It therefore loses its way and will one day cease, since it
is not based on the loving heart, as we saw in Nazi Germany and still see in
communism.75
71Liselotte Malmgard, “Frivillig næstekærlighed og tvungen velfærd,” in I himlen således også
på jorden?, 57–70.
72Alfred Th. Jørgensen, Filantropi. Vejledning i offentlig Forsorg og privat Velgørenhed for
Begyndere (Copenhagen: Lohses Forlag, 1939).
73Jens J. Jensen, “Kirkens plads i velfærdsstaten,” Fyns Venstreblad, September 17, 1952.
74J. D. Christensen, “Humanisme—et overgangsstadium,” Indre Missions Tidende 105, no. 31
(1958): 391.
75See also Kurt Larsen, “Indre Mission, socialt arbejde og velfærdssamfundet,” in I himlen
således også på jorden?, 25–56.
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In the 1930s, 1940s, and 1950s the philanthropic movement still played an
important role, especially as it concerns child welfare. A majority of infant
homes, orphanages, and many day-care institutions were run by non-state
entities, often with a more or less explicit Christian background.76 However,
the state gradually came to play a more and more important role. These
institutions were losing their autonomy, as the need for public funding was
followed by “state recognition,” control, and regulation of both the formal
and practical affairs. In philanthropic organizations’ internal debates, we see
one group expressing skepticism about the state crowding out Christian
values and institutions; while another group argues that cooperation/
coexistence with the state is necessary in order to have an effective child
welfare sector. The Danish church people had of course vested interests in
this discussion of the borderlines between state and philanthropic initiatives.
At a Nordic meeting for deaf clergy, the Danish delegation expressed anxiety
about the development of Christian work in a welfare state where care work
was first and foremost the responsibility of the state, which, being
responsible for the “institutions,” sought major decision-making power.77
Other delegates were less skeptical. In the opinion of Principal of the
Deaconess College in Århus, Folmer Tange Jensen, the problem was that the
church had not yet seriously placed social work on its agenda. Jensen
believed that even with a dominant welfare state, there would still be a place
for church social work:
The fact of the matter is that social need, which cannot be alleviated by using
money, is greater now than ever before. That the welfare state can never
become a pillow for the church, but that, precisely because of its
inevitable accumulation, its barracking of care in establishments and
institutions and “homes” and the like—not to say urban communities—
means that it has created an almost insatiable need for nursing and care,
understanding and personal help.78
Tange Jensen’s successor as principal of The Diaconal College, Jens Nørgaard,
represented a middle-of-the-road position and viewed the welfare state as
having been partially created by the preaching of God’s word.79 Nørgaard
posed the question of what would happen if the church had solved its task,
so that church social work no longer had any legitimate role to play in a
welfare state. Societal demands meant that the state now defined the aims of
76Klaus Petersen, “Børnesagen. Dansk familiepolitik,” in Dansk velfærdshistorie. Mellem skøn
og ret, vol. 2, Perioden 1898–1933, eds. Jørn Henrik Petersen, Klaus Petersen, and Niels Finn
Christiansen (Odense: Syddansk Universitetsforlag, 2010), 739–743.
77Kristeligt Dagblad, September 26, 1956.
78Folmer Tange Jensen, “Diakonien på dagsordnen,” Dansk Kirkeliv 35 (1958): 108–115.
79Jens Nørgaard, “Diakoni i en velfærdsstat,” Dansk Kirkeliv 41 (1962): 54–60.
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welfare work. In that case, there was no place for “compassion.” Compassion
was replaced by social policy. At the same time, it was problematic that the
state only viewed people as production potential that had to be made to
function efficiently. Once the formal conditions were rectified, so would the
individual. This was the prevailing welfare state ideology. For Nørgaard, the
task of the church, as the less endowed provider of social care, was to
encourage the welfare state, so that the state did its utmost and did not
become complacent, since there was no one else to challenge the state’s
authority. In other words, Nørgaard had a notion of interaction between
public welfare and care on the one hand and church social work on the
other, where the church should draw attention to unsolved social problems
and provide the meaning and more personalized services that the welfare
state system could not provide.80
A similar point of view is to be found in the writings of the theologian Otto
Krabbe, leader of the Christian settlement house in Vesterbro, Copenhagen.81
He saw the role of the welfare state as one of ensuring the basic needs for
social security and to fight social problems. Everything beyond these
concerns—questions of wellbeing, happiness, and inter-personal relations—
was the responsibility of the individual person and his or her morality and
beliefs. Hence, even though he applauded the welfare state for providing
material support to those in need, Krabbe remained skeptical toward some of
the possible ethical consequences. He was concerned that that people had
become spoiled and pampered by the welfare state, that they had
relinquished their moral responsibility to society. They wanted to enjoy
welfare benefits and make demands, and all the time they became
increasingly bad-tempered and aggrieved—but did that have anything to do
with the welfare state? For Krabbe, the welfare state was nothing more than
a “money distribution affair,” where the individual paid in when times were
good and received money when times were bad.82 In this sense, the state
held the purse strings, and in a free society, it ought not to be master of
much else. Hence, in a moral sense, the welfare state was supposed to be a
neutral institution without any purpose regarding human satisfaction. It was
a valuable foundation on which to build, but more building had to be done
using something else than material services and welfare guarantees. It was
precisely by ensuring material needs that it became possible to
mobilise our own heat sources as a counter-move, to warm up, liven up,
make each other feel happy and secure—also those who, despite good
80This view was also expressed at the Anglican Church’s Lambeth Conference in 1948.
81Otto Krabbe, “Forgår vi af velfærd?,” Præsteforeningens Blad 49 (1959): 61–68.
82Ibid., 121.
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material provisions, were unable to establish a community and friendship
with others—the lonely, those who found it hard to adapt.
The idea that love of one’s neighbor is something more than just social care,
and that the welfare state is thus no hindrance to caring for others, is also
found in an earlier exchange between two clergymen.
When considering the basis of Lutheran preaching, P. Munch Madsen, vicar
of the village of Jordløse, stated that love of one’s neighbor was mainly the task
of society.83 It was society that was responsible for no one being in need. Love
of one’s neighbor had become social care, thus making society responsible for
the people with whom an individual lived. Madsen’s colleague, P. Augustinus,
replied with an anecdote about a woman who complained to the social security
office that the money was “not given with love.” She was right, said
Augustinus, but the problem was that she was asking for more than the
social security office could give.84 It makes good political sense to eliminate
financial inequalities, but despite all the social measures, there is still an
immense need for love of one’s neighbor.
Some years later, Otto Krabbe once again entered the debate taking a closer
look at many of the objections of church people.85 In a modern society, the
community has taken over a number of areas of responsibility that were
formerly those of the family and the individual alone. Society had established
institutions to carry out tasks that affect the lives of individuals. Consequently,
he asked whether personal responsibility could survive when an increasing
number of areas of responsibility had become collective. Krabbe’s main point
was that responsibility means saying “yes” to an obligation, and what is
important is the content of the obligation rather than the private experience of
the individual. When the obligation refers to all those who (for some reason or
another) are experiencing some kind of social difficulty, then the burden must
be shouldered collectively. When it is not a matter of one’s parents and
children but of all people’s parents and children, an appeal must be made to
the collective feeling of responsibility, which determines how society is to deal
with the task. Hence, Christians have complete freedom—on the same footing
as everybody else—to assume responsibility for and to influence society. This
freedom does not eliminate personal responsibility in any way; on the
contrary, it is a responsibility which could earlier only be borne by the few,
but which has now been spread out to the many.
83P. Munch Madsen, “Er der basis for vor lutherske forkyndelse?,” Præsteforeningens Blad 44
(1954): 120–126.
84P. Augustinus, “Næstekærlighed,” Præsteforeningens Blad 44 (1954): 474.
85Otto Krabbe, Om velfærd og ansvar (Copenhagen: GAD, 1966). One can also refer here to the
contemporary more concrete discussion in Immanuel Hansen, Diakonien i dag (Copenhagen:
Lohses Forlag, 1967).
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Krabbe also wrestled with the oft-advanced assertion that welfare and
security make people pampered, demanding, ungrateful, and materialistic—
that welfare causes a moral decline. He asked if it is the guardian that is
opposing and seeking to curb the majority from being fulfilled. In Krabbe’s
view, there is anxiety at no longer belonging to a financially and socially
safeguarded minority. A classic, philanthropic approach had sought to
improve the moral conduct of those who were not safeguarded via their own
power reserve. Krabbe’s critique is clear:
If we are to talk about a Christian’s particular responsibility, it is this: the
responsibility for standing by our fellow human beings in objective
solidarity, without any philanthropically or Christian subtlety. And then—
and then he gives God his faith. This He dearly wants, but not our deeds.
These he wrote off in favour of the fellow human being, because it was
that person who was in need of them.
VII. CHURCH PEOPLE IN FAVOR OF THE WELFARE STATE
Danish church people expressed varying degrees of skepticism about the
welfare state, from the die-hard rejection the Tidehverv group to more
nuanced and pragmatic skepticism about the boundaries between state,
church, and the individual. However, there were also members of the clergy
who argued in favor of the welfare state. The vicar of Hviding, Torben
Jørgensen, regarded the welfare state as a society that guaranteed all its
citizens protection against political and financial oppression and provided for
everyone from cradle to grave.86 In their view, the welfare state was not a
threat to personal liberty, and it gave the church more freedom than ever before.
Similarly, the college lecturer Johan Kleis, B.D. stressed that the welfare
state did not, as its critics claimed, weaken a person’s moral attitude.87 On
the contrary, it appealed to the individual’s co-responsibility and sympathetic
understanding. The vicar of Vor Frelser Kirke (Our Saviour Church) in
Copenhagen, Carl Trock, was surprised that so many people who ought to
know better from their daily work repeatedly used a Christian way of
thinking as a point of departure for questioning the welfare state.88 Although
it was true that man did not live by bread alone, it was equally true that
bread was a necessity. The welfare state must not be renounced—and most
certainly not in the name of Christianity.
It is difficult to provide a simple characterization of the church people who
spoke in favor of the welfare state. Some had roots in philanthropic (charity)
86Torben Jørgensen, “Tryghed i velfærdsstaten,” Sønderjyden, March 16, 1956.
87J. Kleis, “Velfærdsstat og kristendom,” Information, January 5, 1959.
88C. Trock, “Kristendom og velfærdsstat,” Kristeligt Dagblad, February 4, 1959.
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work, many were not politically active, while Carl Trock, for example, was an
active member of the liberal agrarian party Venstre, which in 1959, together
with the Conservative Party, had launched a strong critique of the welfare
state.89 Hal Koch, D. D., professor of church history and former chairman of
the Union of Danish Youth during the occupation, holds a special place in
the discussion. A convinced Social Democrat, husband to Minister of
Ecclesiastical Affairs (1950–1963) Bodil Koch, and an active folk high
school educator, Koch played a key role in post-war Denmark, especially as
a figure in the public debate.
Koch viewed the welfare state and democracy as being closely
interconnected.90 In a certain way, he was an antipole of Berggrav, arguing
for the necessity of a certain view of life if democracy was to be respected
and to survive. A polity with a special focus on supporting the weak was,
for him, not so much a political issue as a purely juridical and popular
prerequisite for democratic rule. For that reason, the ideal of democratic
education—the “lifestyle state” that Berggrav would probably have called it
—played a decisive role for Koch, who distanced himself from Berggrav’s
strong emphasis on upbringing being a family concern. Koch’s views were
clearly expressed in a speech held at the tenth anniversary of Krogerup Folk
High School.91 In his speech, he referred to Krogerup as a “citizen school”
for those who were interested in the general public good, the res publica,
which was prepared to assume co-responsibility for how life among people
was shaped in the family, neighborhood, workplace, parish, municipality—
indeed, in the whole country. At Krogerup, Koch wanted to train students to
citizen activity and a sense of social responsibility. People had to be
educated to engage themselves in matters of common concern, to understand
society and to develop their individual character as citizens. For Koch—as
for the contemporary British sociologist T. H. Marshall—citizenship was a
vital prerequisite for democracy. Citizenship assumed a common
responsibility that enabled the individual to live in accordance with the
welfare state, dependent as it is on people being concerned about “the
whole,” the “common cause.”
Koch viewed the social-liberal welfare society—especially in its Nordic
version—as an improvement of society far beyond what could have been
imagined. He expressed his regret that the increase in social security
and higher standard of living had not produced general happiness and
89Jørn Henrik Petersen, Klaus Petersen, and Niels Finn Christiansen, eds., Velfærdsstatens
storhedstid. Dansk velfærdshistorie, vol. 4, 1956–1973 (Odense: University of Southern
Denmark Press, 2012), 131.
90Henning Fonsmark, Historien om den danske utopi (Copenhagen: Gyldendal 1991); Jes
Fabricius Møller, Hal Koch—En biografi (Copenhagen: Gads Forlag, 2009).
91Hal Koch, “Staten en fjende?” Politiken, December 2, 1956.
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satisfaction. According to Koch, the ongoing critique of the welfare state and
dissatisfaction over taxes could be explained by the lack of citizen education
that was a prerequisite for a well-functioning democratic society. Far too
many people regarded the state as an enemy. They thought and acted in an
anti-social manner, “milking” the state for as much as they could and
cheating on their taxes. For him, such kind of behavior revealed society’s
political immaturity and placed demands on citizens’ education to think
politically and to reconsider their personal social development. This was a
quite different conclusion than that of Berggrav, though based on the same
situation. Koch argued that Danes were acting too much as “private
individuals,” while the requirements made of the individual as “a member of
society” had been pushed into the background. These ideas were aired
especially in the autumn of 1956.92
Koch’s ideas were based on a division of labor between the two kingdoms—
state and church—although he acknowledged that in practice, they were often
intertwined. This distinction influenced the social reforms around 1900, where
“it was the men of the church who earliest and most clearly recognized the
social need and drew up a program for what ought to be done, while it was
the politicians and the state that utilized the solution to the problem.”93 Even
though he could express a certain skepticism toward the concept of the
welfare state—“the so-called welfare state which, strangely enough, the
Social Democrats, headed by the Prime Minister, profess with such
unreservedness”94—and warned against believing that the welfare state could
solve everyone’s problems,95 Koch became the most prominent churchman
supporting and legitimizing the Social Democratic conceptions of the welfare
state in the early post-war years.
However, Koch was not alone in thinking along these lines. Many people
linked to the Grundtvigian folk high school movement in Denmark shared
his views.96 Koch saw “the popular” (that is, shared by the populus) as a
“quality”—a form of life and a way of thinking that naturally found
expression in the many benefits of the welfare state: security against
unemployment and illness, social protection in old age, and so forth.97 These
benefits were in fact a prerequisite for liberty and humanity—the feeling that
each and every human being has an immediate relation to God, and may
92See Kristeligt Dagblad, October 22, 1956.
93Hal Koch, Fremtiden Formes (Copenhagen: Gyldendal, 1962), 47.
94Hal Koch, “I anledning af kulturudtalelsen,” Politiken, January 16, 1957.
95Hal Koch, “Ikke lykke, men surhed i velfærdsstaten” [Interview] Østsjællands Folkeblad,
October 12, 1956.
96Fonsmark, Historien om den danske utopi, 87–107.
97Hal Koch, “En livsform skal bestå sin prøve,” in Meninger om Fællesmarkedet, ed. Finn
Stubkjær (Copenhagen: Forlaget aktuelle bøger, 1962).
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therefore not be subordinate to anyone else. For Koch, welfare represented a
“folkelighed” (popular democracy) with roots in an old peasant culture that
has managed to transfer its humanity and culture into modern society. This
popular democracy enabled the welfare state to become something more than
just social engineering and material wellbeing.
Other leading theologians of this period picked up this discussion. In 1960,
the church historian and spokesman of university dialectic theology,98 P. G.
Lindhardt, D.D., wrote a seminal article on the extent to which Christianity
was compatible with a welfare state. Lindhardt’s answer—if by
“Christianity” one meant the Christian message that, via the gospels, went all
the way back to Christ—was a definitive “no,” because the Christian
message expressed no desires as to material welfare. Lindhardt had no
wishes in that respect. Christianity was directed toward the individual, whose
relationship to God “works” in his relationship to his neighbor—and this
direct personal relationship cannot be replaced by any kind of secular
political or social order. That would lead only to irresponsibility. Christianity
offers and commands a love that is quite different from worldly reason. The
function of the church is to preach its message, but as an institution, the
church is “of this world” and therefore reflects a conglomerate of religious,
moral, and political ideas.
The criticism that providing care deprived people from taking responsibility,
according to Lindhardt, exaggerated the role of what the state could as well as
it down-played the meaning of responsibility meant. One could just as well
argue that the state’s assumption of economic responsibility for social
security imposed responsibility on the individual toward others that was of a
higher level than merely economic. Citing the writer Villy Sørensen,
Lindhardt felt that “welfare does not have to be the meaning of life because
it is the most the state can achieve.”99 The welfare state does not take
responsibility away from anyone, Lindhardt argued, and does not prevent
anyone from acting against the biblical edict to love thy neighbor. The
welfare state simply expresses the meaning of political understandings—to
take care of people’s best interests and to order our mutual relations for
mutual benefit. The welfare state is neither more nor less Christian than any
other form of state.
98Poul Georg Lindhardt, “Ønsker kristendommen en Velfærdsstat?,” in Hug og Parade, eds.
Frederik Nielsen and Ole H. Petersen (Copenhagen: Gyldendal, 1960), 71–82. Dialectic
theology pays attention to the addressing nature of the gospels and requires the individual to
make a personal decision as an answer to this address. Dialectic theology has played an
important role for Tidehverv, but P. G. Lindhardt was not connected to Tidehverv.
99Villy Sørensen, “Velfærdsstat og personlighed,” in Digtere og dæmoner. Fortolkninger og
vurderinger (Copenhagen: Gyldendal, 1959), 219–228.
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In a more abstract form, we find the same ideas in the writings of the
theologian and influential philosopher K. E. Løgstrup, D.D.,100 who in a
number of works, especially his main work The Ethical Demand,101 outlines
an ideal humanistic Christianity. In an extended dialogue with the jurist Poul
Meyer,102 Løgstrup develops a number of ideas about the relation between
the individual ethical demand and the collective. To simplify slightly,
Løgstrup believes that ethical demands such as love of one’s neighbor or
compassion can be anchored in societal institutions such as the welfare state.
It is hard to always love one’s neighbor—man is weak—but when the norm
is anchored in a collective institution, we are forced at least to act as if we
loved our neighbor. The welfare state is therefore a surrogate for love of
one’s neighbor.
VIII. CONCLUSION
This contribution analyzed the views held by Danish church people regarding
the welfare state, as expressed in a period when the general debate on the
welfare state culminated in Denmark. Earlier research on the connections
between Lutheranism and the welfare state in Denmark have focused largely
on the events prior to the modern social policy legislation, and on this
background, developed more or less anachronistic arguments.
Since the Danish discussion got underway later than in the United States,
Britain, and Norway, it may very well have been influenced by international
discussions. As far as the church people were concerned, it is especially the
Norwegian influence—as expressed by Bishop Eivind Berggrav—that is
striking, and through Berggrav, positions from the interwar British
discussions also entered the Danish debate. However, it is worth noting that
the debate over the welfare state in Denmark and Norway differed from that
in Britain. In the 1950s, the Scandinavian welfare state evolved into a larger,
more state-centered and interventionist social security system (along with
other characteristics of the Scandinavian welfare model) and a growing
belief in the rationality of this model (what might be called “welfarism”).
This evolution both triggered and influenced the debate.
100Jørn Henrik Petersen and Lis Holm Petersen, “Næstekærlighed og velfærdsstat,” in 13 værdier
for den danske velfærdsstat, eds. Jørn Henrik Petersen, Klaus Petersen, and Lis Holm Petersen
(Odense: Syddansk Universitetsforlag, 2007), 113–134; Svend Andersen and Kees van Kooten
Niekerk, eds., Concern for the Other: Perspectives on the Ethics of K. E. Løgstrup (Notre
Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 2008).
101Knud Løgstrup, The Ethical Demand (Minneapolis: Alasdair Macintyre, 1971). The book was
originally published in Danish in 1956.
102See Petersen and Petersen, “Gensidig eller ensidig,” 209–230.
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In his Hannover speech about the church and the welfare state, Berggrav
stressed that “Lutherans are a many-headed company.”103 This is confirmed
by several contributions made by Danish church people to the welfare state
debate from 1945 onward. As in the general welfare state discussion, the
critical voices predominate, but there are also those who do not fear
the welfare state, and may even see it as a positive development. Overall, the
picture is characterized by just as many different attitudes and evaluations as
in the rest of the population.
At the core of the entire discussion lies a general assumption about the state
in modernity. This discussion generates two derivative issues: the Christian’s
duty to obey the state—the doctrine of the two kingdoms—and the relation
between church and state. Behind these issues lay the general European
debate about the relation between a constitutional state and a power state and
the fear that the constitutional state, if enlarged with tasks of welfare as a
welfare state, had a tendency to demonize itself. To varying degrees, the
debaters sought to find a conceptual definition of the welfare state and its
basic values, ranging from a highly instrumental conception to a more
negative view of the welfare state as a view-of-life state or, as one person
put it: “The state as God. Politics as religion. Ideology as a doctrine of
salvation.”104 For those who did not have an instrumental view as their
foundation, a central issue was the relation between the order of being of the
welfare state, morality, and the source of morals. A recurrent point made in
that connection was that morality has to be based on something that lay
outside the state itself, so that morality did not end up being self-referential
for its existence. This problem also includes the debaters’ conception of the
welfare state’s view of human nature and their attitude toward the single
individual, just as the moral basis is closely linked to the debate about
compassion in the form of church social work as opposed to services laid
down by law—or, more generally, the relation between love of one’s
neighbor and institutionalized love of one’s neighbor. Finally, a number of
people were preoccupied with the possible economic side effects of the
welfare state. The rather scattered, predominantly critical views and attitudes
call for circumspection and do not approach anything that could be called a
“Lutheran welfare doctrine.” Lutherans seem to be just as much in
disagreement with each other about the welfare state as people in general. In
fact, it was the weakest voice in the church people’s debate that triumphed
institutionally. This suggests that patterns of alliance and skills at coalition
103Berggrav, “Stat og kirke i dag etter luthersk syn, Foredrag på det lutherske verdensforbunds
møte i Hannover 1952,” 454.
104Holt, “Velfærdsstaten,” 5.
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building were more decisive in the elaboration of the welfare state than any
kind of “secularized Lutheranism” philosophy.
As the examples show, some church people also had close links to political
parties and acted politically. The most prominent example here was Hal Koch,
with his close connection to the Social Democratic Party. Koch’s close ties and
political position was exceptional: his wife was a member of government, and
Koch himself was directly involved in policy-making as chairman of a public
commission. We do not find any clear party political pattern within the group
studies in this article and the opinions of the church people is much better
understood as church people on entering a debate that was highly politicized
than as party political statements. A concern about modern society on the
one hand and the legitimacy of the church on the other triggered their
religiously founded argumentations. This dual nature of the debate also
means that the positions cannot be reduced to a function of their positions
within the church. Bishops, for example, do not appear as a unified group
having a single ideological position. They are neither all public servants
defending the welfare state nor are all of them conservative defenders of
specific theological positions. Similarly, the group of clergymen reflects a
wide variety of opinions. As we have shown, there is a tendency that people
closely involved in philanthropic work are more pragmatic in their approach
to the welfare state than the more academically minded colleagues in the
theological milieus (for example, the Tidehverv group). This does not mean
that the philanthropists are not also skeptical or that they have strong
reservations. Nor does it mean that all those in the academic camp were
single-mindedly critical (as the example of Løgstrup, the most academic of
them all, clearly shows).
For several reasons, it is difficult to measure the significance of the church
people’s discussion of the welfare policy development in Denmark in any
accurate way. The debates not only lead in different directions, but it is also
notoriously difficult to measure the importance of ideas and discourses.105
From the beginning of the century and onward, the church gradually lost
ground in relation to the welfare state and public solutions to social
problems, both when it came to setting the agenda and as provider of
welfare. In a larger study of the history of Danish social policy, therefore, we
do not find Christian ethics and references to Christian values playing any
significant role in the political debate about concrete social reforms.106
During the entire period, there was an internal discussion within the church
105See Daniel Béland and Robert Henry Cox, eds., Ideas and Politics in Social Science Research
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010).
106See Jørn Henrik Petersen, Klaus Petersen, and Niels Finn Christiansen, eds., Dansk
velfærdshistorie. Velfærdsstaten i støbeskeen, vol. 3, Perioden 1933–1956 (Odense: Syddansk
Universitetsforlag, 2012), 87–152.
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(especially around the role and practice of philanthropy), but in parliament,
religious arguments have largely played out their role, aside from
fundamental ethical discussions on issues such as abortion (which was
liberalized in Denmark in 1973). However, we find that the proponents of
church philanthropy succeeded in ensuring it a continued place in the realm
of social policy, especially in issues of social work and family policy. And
we find a clear echo of the church people’s critique of the welfare state in
the broader political debate in the 1950s, focusing especially around the
welfare state’s totalitarian tendencies.
In terms of the larger research discussion about the church and the welfare
state, our investigation shows that church people tended to be just as divided
in their attitude to the welfare state as the rest of the population. When the
church and the modern welfare state encountered each other in the post-war
period, both parties had their guards up. This resembles the picture from
Great Britain, and to a certain extent Norway and Sweden, where criticism
was more vociferous than in Denmark. Hence, we must reject the hypothesis
of “the Nordic welfare state” as the result of a particular Lutheran heritage
and tradition. Of course, this is not the same as writing off the influence of
religion or the church. Nevertheless, it gives rise to critical reflections and
indicates that if one wishes to identify the role played by Lutheranism for
the Nordic model, one should not choose an actor’s perspective. Church-
state conflicts did not become a crucial dividing line in Nordic politics,
unlike in Central Europe. This does not exclude the possibility that
Lutheranism may have influenced the basic values and historical roots of the
welfare state. More research is needed to further elucidate this relationship.
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